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Abstract 
What is the relation between divine unchangeability and the reality of change as implied in 
ideas of creation and redemption? Western Trinitarian theology in the 20
th
 century tended 
toward emphasizing the significance of change above divine unchangeability, giving it a 
modalist and Hegelian flavour that questioned the continuity with the church fathers. For this 
reason, it has been criticized by Orthodox theologians like Vladimir Lossky and David 
Bentley Hart. Newer scholarship has shown the significance of Luther’s appropriation of the 
doctrine of divine unknowability and his insistence on the difference between revelation and 
divine essence for his understanding of the Trinity, which thus may appear to be much closer 
to the position of the Orthodox critics than to the Lutheran theologians criticized by them. 
There thus seems to be an unused potential in Luther’s doctrine of the Trinity that should be 
of interest both for systematic and ecumenical theology. 
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I. The problem 
 
One of the most basic and at the same time most challenging problems of the Christian 
doctrine of God is the question of the relation between divine unchangeability on the one 
hand and the reality of change on the other. There is a strong philosophical and theological 
tradition for considering God as eternal and timeless and void of change.
1
 At the same time, 
                                                 
1
This seems to be implied, e.g., in biblical passages like Ps 90:2: “Before the mountains were brought 
forth, or ever you had formed the earth and the world, from everlasting to everlasting you are God” 
and Jas 1:17: “Every generous act of giving, with every perfect gift, is from above, coming down 
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ideas of creation and redemption imply change in the sense that God thereby establishes 
something that was not there before.
2
 Can God then remain the same with creation as in his 
eternal and unrelated essence? If the answer to that question is yes, concepts like creation, 
redemption and revelation may seem to come fairly close to the meaningless, as they after all 
don’t seem to refer to anything significant having ever occurred, at least not as far as God is 
concerned. History, then, becomes a theologically unimportant concept. On the other hand, if 
the answer is no and one accepts that God is in fact influenced by his relationship with the 
world he has created and redeemed to the extent that this establishes a new reality even for 
God, are then concepts like eternity, timelessness and unchangeability at all applicable to 
God? 
 The doctrine of the Trinity is arguably an attempt at solving this problem. Within a 
Christian context, love is among the central predicates of the divine,
3
 but if the world is not to 
be considered as necessary for God to become God, this love must be independent of God’s 
relation to the world. The object of God’s eternal love cannot then be any other than God 
himself. The idea of divine love as eternal in the sense of world-independent in this way 
necessitates a difference within the oneness of the divine essence to the effect that God from 
eternity loves God in God. This seems to be the only way of maintaining the idea of divine 
independence in relation to the world in a way that lets the world be loved by God in freedom 
and not by logical necessity. Interestingly, this internal relationship in God is what seems to 
be the message of the biblical story of the baptism of Jesus, where the following is said by the 
Father with the Spirit as witness: “This is my Son, the Beloved, with whom I am well 
pleased.”4 The story of the baptism of Jesus may then be what in the Bible comes closest to a 
                                                                                                                                                        
from the Father of lights, with whom there is no variation or shadow due to change.” All Bible 
quotations are from New Revised Standard Version. 
2
E.g., Ps 33:9: “He spoke, and it came to be”; 2 Cor 5:17: “So if anyone is in Christ, there is a new 
creation: everything old has passed away; see, everything has become new!” 
3
Cf., e.g., 1 John 4:8: “God is love.” 
4
Matt 3:17. Admittedly, this story in itself hardly contains the idea of the Son’s preexistence, which 
obviously is necessary for it to count as a biblical foundation for the doctrine of the Trinity. But if 
read in light of the explicit reference to the Trinity in the conclusion of the Gospel (Matt 28:19), there 
can hardly be any doubt that both the story of the baptism and its close parallel, the story of the 
Transfiguration, presuppose a doctrine of the Son’s preexistence. 
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revelation of the eternal relation between the Father, the Son and the Spirit. 
 Much of the renewal of Trinitarian theology in the 20
th
 century has, however, tended 
to interpret the doctrine of the Trinity in a way that still emphasizes change over 
unchangeability by reading the story of creation and/or redemption as a definition of divine 
essence. This is an emphasis that seems to be common for Karl Barth’s understanding of the 
atonement as anticipated from eternity,
5
 for Karl Rahner’s insistence on the identity between 
immanent and economic Trinity
6
 as appropriated by Eberhard Jüngel
7
 and Robert Jenson,
8
 
and for Jürgen Moltmann’s understanding of the cross of Christ as a critique of the idea of 
divine impassibility.
9
 This approach has its problems, though. The continuity with the 
theology of the Trinity in the old church may be weak,
10
 the influence from Hegelian 
rationalism seems to be undeniable,
11
 and the approach may reveal a kind a modalism that 
after all implies an understanding of the world as essential for God to be God.
12
 If there is no 
divine difference and history tells us everything about God, then God and history become 
                                                 
5
 Stanley J Grenz, Rediscovering the triune God, 48-49; Peter Goodwin Heltzel and Christian T. 
Collins Winn, “Karl Barth, reconciliation and the Trinue God,” 178-81; Bruce L. McCormack, 
Orthodox and modern: Studies in the theology of Karl Barth, 213-21. McCormack’s interpretation of 
Barth has, however, been criticized as one-sided; see Paul D. Molnar, “Can the electing God be God 
without us?” and Paul D. Molnar, “Orthodox and modern: Just how modern was Barth’s later 
theology?”. 
6
Peter C. Phan, “Karl Rahner’s theology of the Trinity,” 197-201. 
7
Eberhard Jüngel, Gottes Sein ist im Werden. 
8
Robert W. Jenson, Systematic theology 1, cf. the central quotation p. 57: “The God to be interpreted 
in this work is the God identified by the biblical narrative.” 
9
Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, “The trinitarian doctrines of Moltmann and Pannenberg,” 223-29. 
10
So, e.g., Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and its legacy: An approach to fourth-century Trinitarian theology. 
The significance of this observation may be contested; if God develops with the world, the doctrinal 
continuity of the church becomes less important. 
11
For a summary of Hegel’s doctrine of the Trinity, see Grenz, Rediscovering the triune God, 24-32, 
for a discussion of its influence on Barth, see Adam Eitel, “The resurrection of Jesus Christ: Karl 
Barth and the historicization of God’s being”. 
12
Paul L. Gavrilyuk, “God’s Impassible Suffering in the Flesh”; Bruce Marshall, “The Dereliction of 
Christ”. 
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identical. 
 Emphasizing an appreciation of the irreducible difference between uncreated 
unchangeability and created change as essential for the Christian understanding of God, 
Orthodox theologians have therefore been quite critical of what they see as the Hegelian and 
modalist moves of 20
th
 century Western theology. Two of most outspoken critics are 
Vladimir Lossky, who in relation to this problem defends the Palamite distinction between 
God’s essence and his energies, and David Bentley Hart, who finds the idea of divine 
apatheia or impassibility to be indispensable for Christian theology.
13
 What are the reasons 
they give for their particular emphases, and do they succeed in appropriating the biblical 
difference between unchangeability and change in a better way than the contemporary 
Western theologies of the Trinity do? 
 Investigations of the theology of the Reformers have to a large extent been 
overlooking the understanding of the Trinity, considering it as an uncontroversial and 
therefore uninteresting part of the 16
th
 century debate.
14
 This view has recently been 
challenged by investigations of Luther’s Trinitarian disputations of the 1540's, suggesting 
that Luther had a doctrine of the Trinity that actually comes quite close to Lossky’s and 
Hart’s emphasis on changelessness and impassibility.15 How far do these parallels go? Does 
the explicit adoption of the church fathers’ teaching on perichoresis and communicatio 
                                                 
13
Whereas Vladimir Lossky, The mystical theology of the Eastern church, 45, criticizes the (Hegelian) 
idea of “trinitarian development” without mentioning any names, David B. Hart, The Beauty of the 
Infinite, 155-67 is much more specific in his critique of 20
th
 century Hegelian modalism particularly 
as he finds it in the work of Robert Jenson. For Jenson’s defence against the critique, see Robert W. 
Jenson, “Ipse Pater Non Est Impassibilis”. 
14
For a discussion of the lack of appreciation of the doctrine of the Trinity in 19
th
 and 20
th
 century 
Luther scholarship, see Christine Helmer, The trinity and Martin Luther, 8-25. 
15
Helmer, The trinity and Martin Luther, or the shorter summary in Christine Helmer, “God from 
eternity to eternity: Luther’s trinitarian understanding,” and further Dennis Bielfeldt, “Luther’s Late 
Trinitarian Disputations,” and Paul R. Hinlicky, “Luther’s New Langauge of the Spirit”. There is also 
a significant critique of what is called “the Hegelian ‘natural theology of the cross’” in Jüngel, 
Pannenberg, Moltmann and Jenson in Mark C. Mattes, The role of justification in contemporary 
theology (quotation from p. 9). 
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idiomatum by the Lutheran reformers
16
 even amount to an appropriation of the essentials of 
the Orthodox understanding of the Trinity? Do we find ourselves in a situation where 
contemporary Orthodox critics of central elements in the Western approach maintain a 
position that may be closer to Luther’s than what is found by contemporary Lutheran 
theologians like Jüngel and Jenson, and among contemporary Western theologians in 
general? If that is indeed the case, it might open new possibilities both in relation to 
theological research and ecumenical dialogue. The question is therefore well worth a closer 
look. 
 
II. The position of Lossky and Hart 
 
Lossky approaches the problem of the relation between divine changelessness and the reality 
of change from the apophatic presupposition of divine unknowability, and, following in the 
footsteps of Dionysius the Areopagite, sets deification through contemplation, not knowledge 
as the goal for the relation with God (43).
17
 One therefore relates to the Trinity as “something 
which transcends all notion both of nature and of person” (44). There are no processions or 
inner determinations in the Godhead, in fact, even the number three expresses nothing more 
than “the ineffable order within the Godhead”, and through grace, the contemplating subject 
can attain to the same “state of eternal stability” or “apátheia” (48). Within this way of 
thinking, there is therefore “no place for a theology . . . of the divine essence”; the goal of 
Orthodox spirituality being “a participation in the divine life” through which one possesses 
“by grace all that the Holy Trinity possesses by nature” (65). Lossky thus solves the problem 
of the relation between changelessness and changeability by letting humans, who by nature 
belong to the realm of the latter, by grace being included in the realm of the former. 
 In order for this not to be interpreted as a subversion of the difference between the 
uncreated and the created, Lossky appeals to the Palamite – and ineffable – distinction 
between “the essence of God, . . . which is inaccessible, unknowable and incommunicable; 
and the energies or divine operations . . . in which He goes forth from Himself . . . and gives 
                                                 
16
Concerning Luther’s position in this respect, see Johann Anselm Steiger, “The communicatio 
idiomatum as the axle and motor of Luther’s theology”. 
17
References to page numbers in Lossky, The mystical theology of the Eastern church. 
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Himself” (70), maintaining that human communication with God is limited to the energies. 
This implies a distinction between the manifestations of God “within the realm of economy” 
(71) and the “incommunicability of his essence” (73). Still, God is “wholly present in each 
ray of His divinity” (74). The distinction between essence and energies is not dependent on 
the world being created, nor does it imply that the world becomes coeternal with God as the 
divine energies are (74). In this way, Lossky tries to maintain the reality of revelatory change 
without compromising the idea of divine unchangeability.
18
 
 This certainly implies a rejection of Rahner’s Rule of the identity between the 
economic and immanent Trinity even if Lossky does not spell out this rejection in so many 
words.
19
 There is in Lossky indeed a difference between divine unknowable simplicity and 
the differentiations of its manifestations, though even for Lossky, an understanding of the 
inner relations of the Trinity belong to the realm of economy and revelation. The relation 
between the essence/energy-distinction and the immanence/economy-distinction in Lossky’s 
thought is not always easy to grasp, though, and remains one of the most contested and 
debatable aspects of his approach.
20
 
 This may be part of the reason why David Bentley Hart takes Rahner’s Rule “as  
axiomatic for all meditation upon the Christian doctrine of God” (155)21 in so far as one 
needs to take seriously “the scriptural understanding of how God has acted within history for 
the restoration of the created world” (156). In doing so, however, one needs to pay attention 
to two perils inherent in Rahner’s maxim. It could be taken as implying a “theological 
repristination of Hegel’s ‘trinitarian’ logic” abolishing “any distinction between God’s 
immanence and his gracious presence within history” to the extent that “God depends upon 
creation to be God and that creation exists by necessity . . ., so that God is robbed of his true 
transcendence and creation of its true gratuity”  –  this is in fact an error Hart finds in the 
                                                 
18
Cf. the following summary of Lossky’s position: “The notion of the unknowable essence of God 
affirms both the freedom of God from created existence and the integrity of created existence.” 
(Aristotle Papanikolaou, “Divine energies or divine personhood,” 359). 
19
So Papanikolaou, “Divine energies or divine personhood,” 371. 
20
For a summary of this critique, see Aristotle Papanikolaou, “The Trinity in contemporary Orthodox 
theology,” 249. 
21
Numbers in parenthesis refer to page numbers in Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite. 
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works of both Jüngel, Pannenberg and Jenson (156-157). Or one could succumb to the 
temptation of forsaking the economic for the immanent Trinity, thus establishing a 
speculative account of God and neglecting the essentiality of the story of Christ (168), though 
Hart does not accept the critique that classical Western theologians like Augustine and 
Thomas in general can be thought to have committed this error. 
 To avoid the first of these perils, the identification of God with history, Hart finds it 
necessary to retain the idea of God’s immutability or apatheia as essential for Christian 
theology (159); according to Hart, “the juxtaposition of the language of divine apatheia with 
the story of crucified love is . . . what makes the entire narrative of salvation in Christ 
intelligible” (160). If God does not love us with an immutability that was there even when we 
were not, his love becomes a reaction and is dethroned from its position as “primordial 
generosity” and “the ontological possibility of every ontic action” (166). But love as reaction 
– Hart explicitly refers to what he calls “the ‘supralapsarian’ understanding of the incarnation 
in its depressing Lutheran and Calvinist forms” (164) as an example of this idea –  is not the 
biblical doctrine of “the blissfull and desiring apatheia that requires no pathos to evoke it, no 
evil to make it good”. Even the cross of Christ, then, “does not determine the nature of divine 
love, but rather manifests it”; even before sin there is divine love as “an outpouring that is . . . 
indefectible happiness”. God’s impassibility is for this reason essentially seen as the loving 
relation between the persons of the Trinity from eternity (167) understood as “the ground of 
Christian hope, central to the positive message of the evangel” (355).  
 Hart’s deliberations are clearly informed by an understanding parallel to Lossky’s of 
the theological necessity of avoiding the idea of God being determined by history, even if the 
actual event is that of the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ. On the contrary, it is the 
insistence of this particular story as the manifestation of divine apatheia that opens the 
perspective of it being the foundation of an eternal hope. By avoiding the essence/energy-
distinction and replacing it with the idea of the immutability of divine love, however, Hart 
gives the doctrine of the Trinity a more focused soteriological emphasis while at the same 
time highlighting the implication that the determination of God by history essentially 
amounts to his love being determined by evil as divine reaction. If the love of God is eternal 
and changeless it must be conceived as a reality independent of the story of creation, fall and 
redemption, even if this story certainly determines the circumstances under which it is made 
manifest. In this way, Hart shows that only a doctrine of divine changelessness is consistent 
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with the understanding of the inherent goodness of creation and the understanding of God as 
eternal love. 
 
III. Time and eternity in Luther’s doctrine of the Trinity 
 
Luther works and writes from within the same apophatic tradition as Lossky and Hart. This 
can be seen from a number of emphases in his works. He has a deep, but not uncritical 
familiarity with the works of Dionysius the Areopagite.
22
 He distinguishes sharply between 
God’s unknowable essence and his manifestation in revelation; in Luther’s view; God and 
Scripture differ in basically the same sense as Creator and creation differ, the implication 
being that the res of the Scripture is all clarity even if God in his unknowability is not.
23
 The 
similarity with the Palamite essence/energy-distinction is here obvious; Luther is clearly 
intent of safeguarding the reality of revelation in a way that precludes any attempts at 
speculation about the inner essence of the divine.
24
 The same can be seen in his discussion of 
the problem of patripassianism; deeply informed by the Chalcedonian understanding of the 
inseparability of the natures of Christ he accepts the argument that “Christ died, Christ is 
God, therefore God died,”25 but immediately adds that this cannot be said about what he calls 
“der abgesonderte Gott”, i.e., God as perceived in his unknowability apart from his 
                                                 
22
Knut Alfsvåg, “Luther as a reader of Dionysius the Areopagite”. It is an implication of Jenson’s 
one-sidedly economical approach that he has to consider the entire Dionysian tradition as “bluntly 
pre-Christian” (Jenson, Systematic theology 1, 152). 
23
Martin Luther, D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (WA), vol. 18, 606,10-28 (De 
servo arbitrio, 1525). For a discussion of this passage within the context of Luther’s work, see Knut 
Alfsvåg, What no mind has conceived, 239-43. 
24
Interestingly, there has been a lot of scholarly discussion concerning the integration of Luther’s 
understanding of unknowability in his general theological project that to a certain extent parallels the 
critique of Lossky referred to above (note ); for a summary of the critique and a defence of Luther’s 
position, see Knut Alfsvåg, “Who has known the mind of the Lord?” and Klaas Zwanepol, “Zur 
Diskussion um Gottes Verborgenheit”. 
25
WA 50,589,24-25: “Christus ist gestorben, Und Christus ist Gott, drumb ist Gott gestorben" (Von 
den Konziliis und Kirchen, 1539).  
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incarnational manifestation.
26
  
 The distinction between God as fully determined by the cross and in his word on the 
one hand and as impassible in his eternity on the other is thus one that by Luther is 
considered as essential. In this respect, there seems to be a considerable difference between 
the position of Luther and that of contemporary Lutherans like Jüngel and Jenson; for what 
reasons and to which effect this difference is maintained, would, however, have to be the 
topic of another investigation. For now, I would like to explore how a similar vision of the 
significance and limitation of revelation-based theology also informs Luther’s understanding 
of the Trinity. 
 The essentials of Luther’s Trinitarian theology is most easily grasped through a study 
of the theses he wrote for some of the doctoral disputations at the University of Wittenberg in 
1543 and 1544.
27
 Luther’s point of departure is that God is one and triune, the only Creator of 
everything outside of himself. This oneness is, however, of another kind than oneness in 
creation and mathematics in that it allows for the Trinity of distinct divine persons, among 
whom only the Son has assumed humanity (287,13-25). Luther explores this understanding 
of divine oneness by relating it to Aristotle’s concept of the infinite. Working from the 
principle of the coextension of intelligibility and existence, Aristotle rejects the existence of 
what he calls actual infinity (limitless succession) because it cannot be thought. For Luther, 
this amounts to a rejection of the possibility of the existence of God for the reason that it falls 
without the realm of created rationality, a conclusion he finds absurd (255,5-10).
28
 In 
                                                 
26
"Nicht der abgesonderte Gott, sondern der vereinigte Gott mit der Menscheit, Denn vom 
abgesonderten Gott ists beides falsch, Nemlich, das Christus Gott sey, und Gott gestorben sey, Beides 
ists falsch, denn da ist Gott nicht mensch” (WA 50,589,25-28). On this particular aspect of Luther’s 
thought, see further Paul R. Hinlicky, Luther and the beloved community: A path for Christian 
theology after Christendom, chapter two: “‘One of the Trinity suffered’: Luther’s Neo-Chalcedonian 
Christology”. 
27
WA 39II, in the following referenced by page and line number. There is an English translation of 
the theses without the arguments in Dennis Bielfeldt, Mickey L. Mattox, and Paul R. Hinlicky, The 
substance of faith: Luther’s doctrinal theology for today, 191-209. 
28
Helmer, The trinity and Martin Luther, 80-90; Helmer, “God from eternity to eternity: Luther’s 
trinitarian understanding,” 135. This in reality amounts to a critique of Thomas Aquinas’ concept of 
God that was anticipated by Nicholas Cusanus; see Alfsvåg, What no mind has conceived, 126. 
Helmer one-sidedly refers to Ockham as Luther’s predecessor in this respect, whereas his familiarity 
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Luther’s view, one cannot meaningfully determine divine matters according to the principle 
of human comprehensibility.
29
 Aristotle did, however, accept the potential infinity (the sum 
of existing phenomena), but, as Luther correctly remarks, this is a worldly concept of infinity 
that is not at all relevant in relation to God (255,13-14). For similar reasons, Luther takes care 
to keep the concept of generation free from any temporal connotations when it is used as 
referring to the relations between the persons of the Trinity (254,21-255,2).
30
 
 This emphasis on the inability to draw conclusions from creation to the Creator does, 
however, in Luther’s view not disable the possibility of speaking about the inner aspect of the 
Trinity any more than it does for Lossky or Hart, but it qualifies it in the sense that this must 
be done exclusively on the basis of what has been revealed concerning these matters through 
the work of the Holy Spirit.
31
 Luther therefore explicitly rejects as unhelpful Duns Scotus’ 
attempt at explaining the relation between oneness and trinity by means of the difference 
between formal and real distinction (287,29-30)
32
 and accepts the critique against Petrus 
Lombardus for having distinguished between essence and persons in a way that in reality 
established a quaternity (287,31-288,2).
33
 Luther’s own strategy is to accept the language of 
                                                                                                                                                        
with apophaticism is probably at least equally important. In this text, Luther accepts Aristotle’s 
understanding of the limitation of human rationality in this respect; in the Heidelberg Disputation 
(1518), however, he challenged it, referring to Plato’s understanding of infinity as theologically 
relevant in a way Aristotle’s is not; see Alfsvåg, What no mind has conceived, 192-96. 
29
“Non valet argumentum a creaturis a creatorem” (308,1). According to Bielfeldt, “Luther’s Late 
Trinitarian Disputations,” 104, Luther in this way conceives the Trinity as “a paradoxical state of 
affairs that cannot be conceived within standard philosophical categories.” 
30
Helmer, The trinity and Martin Luther, 75-79. 
31
Helmer, The trinity and Martin Luther, 69-71. 
32
A real distinction is the distinction between the different elements of a composite being, which 
clearly does not apply to God, while a formal distinction is the distinction between elements that 
cannot disappear without the whole disappearing; see further Alexander Broadie, “Duns Scotus and 
William Ockham,” 258-63. 
33
Lombardus rejected the idea of divine generation to retain the dogma of divine impassibility. Luther 
agrees with Lombardus that God is impassible and for this reason does not generate in the absolute 
sense (he does not generate other gods), but that this does not pertain to the relation between the 
persons of the Trinity.  See Bielfeldt, “Luther’s Late Trinitarian Disputations,” 77-79. This is 
important for Bielfeldt’s argument that Luther is a semantic realist. 
  
11 
the Bible and the doctrinal tradition of the church without pretending he has the ability to 
clarify the metaphysical relationship between concepts like person, hypostasis, nature and 
substance. One has to stay satisfied by repeating what God has said without being able to 
penetrate its logic (364,8-16). Far from being dependent on preconceived metaphysical 
concepts in his understanding of the Trinity, Luther feels free to use exegesis of the central 
biblical and confessional texts as the foundation of philosophical critique.
34
 
 Luther in this way integrates the apophatic and kataphatic elements of the Christian 
understanding of God to the effect that he can refer to both at the same time: “Do muß man 
still schweigen und sprechen: Deus loquitur ibi, audio, esse unum Deum et tres personae, wie 
Das zugeht, nescio” (364,17-365,3).35 He does not equate the unknowability of the divine 
with the immanent Trinity any more than Lossky and Hart do;
36
 to the extent that it has been 
revealed, even the inner aspect of the Trinity certainly is a proper subject for theology. But in 
applying itself to this task, theology should abstain from any pretension of being able to give 
an explanation of the eternal relationships in God. 
 Luther is also very specific about the theological significance of confessing both 
unchangeable, and for that reason unknowable, divine oneness and the reality of revelation 
both concerning the immanent and economic Trinity. It aims at guarding the reliability of the 
gospel as divine promise, which would evaporate if God were to be subject to change and 
instability in the same sense as the world.
37
 Even more than in the Trinitarian disputations, 
this comes through in the Luther-hymn, “Nun freut euch lieben Christen gmeyn” (1524).38 
                                                 
34
For reasons that seem to border on their own kind of inexplicability, Helmer insists on referring to 
Luther as dependent on Ockham in his critique of Trinitarian metaphysics, even if she is aware this is 
not correct: “Moving beyond both Scotus and Ockham, Luther turns back to a terminology he claims 
is biblical” (Helmer, The trinity and Martin Luther, 101) by distinguishing between the res of relation 
and the res of divine essence in a way “Ockham would never have considered” (p. 106). 
35
“Then one must keep silence and speak: Here God speaks and I listen: There is one God and three 
persons, and I don’t know how this can be.” 
36
I follow Helmer, The trinity and Martin Luther, 82 in her critique of Graham White, Luther as 
Nominalist in this respect. 
37
Helmer, The trinity and Martin Luther, 33-36, 120. 
38
WA 35,422-425; for an English translation, see Martin Luther, Luther’s works (LW), vol. 53,219-
220. There is a shortened, and not entirely successful, translation of the hymn as number 594 in 
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This hymn clearly differentiates between the biographical, and hence temporal description of 
human despair in verses two and three and the divine action inaugurated from verse four, 
which is motivated by the fact that “God in eternity” deplores this misery.39 Clearly and 
carefully Luther draws the line between God’s eternal mercy, which by no means is 
dependent for its existence on the depravity of humanity, and the divine resolve to act 
motivated by the interaction between the eternity of divine mercy and the temporality of 
human sin. In relation to the human misery described in verses two and three, God “thought 
of his mercy” (verse three), he did not conceive it. There is thus no supralapsarian motivation 
of the incarnation as far as this hymn is concerned.
40
  
 On the contrary, salvation has its origin in the inner relationship in the Trinity; the 
gospel is grounded in the eternal relation between the Father and the Son.
41
 Redemption is 
then the outward manifestation of the internal and eternal loving relationship between the 
persons of the Trinity. Only in this way the gospel can be received as an unchangeable 
promise of divine love that will carry its receivers all the way to the eternal fellowship with 
God as mediated by the One who is both fully God and fully human and therefore proclaims 
                                                                                                                                                        
Worship,  and another, much closer to the original as number 299 in Lutheran Book of Worship. The 
translations quoted in the following are my own. This hymn is also the main text for discussion in 
Oswald Bayer, “Poetological doctrine of the trinity”.  
39
As emphasized by Helmer, The trinity and Martin Luther, 164, the divine attitude toward human 
misery is determined by his mercy, whereas divine judgement is exclusively linked to the perspective 
of free will in verse three (p. 151). There is then according to this hymn no law/gospel-dichotomy in 
God (p. 149). 
40
According to Bayer, “Poetological doctrine of the trinity,” 47, “the following alternative is 
shattered: either to regard God’s incarnation as a necessary actualization of an eternal decision of 
predestination . . . or to interpret the incarnation as a reaction to human sin.” The objection against a 
supralapsarian understanding of the incarnation even in a Lutheran context  (so Hart, see page  above) 
might be relevant in relation to Jenson, who essentially follows Barth here (Jenson, Systematic 
theology 1, 140-41); it is not in relation to Luther. As maintained by Helmer, “God from eternity to 
eternity: Luther’s trinitarian understanding,” 139, the anthropological law/gospel-dialectics must even 
in a Lutheran context be placed in the wider framework of delight in the work of the Trinity as is done 
in this hymn. 
41
Helmer, “God from eternity to eternity: Luther’s trinitarian understanding,” 140. 
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the following: “For I am yours and you are mine, and where I am you will be, too.”42 The 
verses seven through ten are all spoken by the Son to the congregation and contain the 
promise that he will give the Spirit to speak in his name to comfort, teach and lead the 
congregation in truth. The hymn is written as a fulfilment of this promise, taking as its 
starting point the congregation’s praise as the manifestation of the advent of the Spirit 
promised in verse nine.
43
 
 Differing from a dominating trend in 20
th
 century Lutheran theology, there is no 
natural theology of the cross in Luther. On the contrary, the idea of divine changelessness 
that even for Luther draws the epistemological dividing line between the knowability of 
creation and the unknowability of the divine, is for him an absolute precondition for the 
gospel being heard as gospel, i.e., as a promise unperturbed by the variations of temporality. 
Only then it can be heard in time as the word of God of eternity. For this to work, both the 
work of creation and redemption and its appropriation by the believing community must be 
considered as nothing but the outward manifestation of the eternal inner relationships of love 
between the persons of the Trinity. There thus seems to be no major differences between the 
theological emphases of Luther, Lossky and Hart. 
 
IV. The Lutheran - Orthodox dialogue – a false start with new possibilities? 
 
For those familiar with the history of the Orthodox - Lutheran relationship, which in itself is a 
rather slender topic, this is a conclusion that may call forth a number of objections. Did not 
the Reformers, apparently expecting a kind of congeniality, contact the Orthodox leaders 
already in the 16
th
 century, but with no significant results as far as the discovery of common 
                                                 
42
This entails both a Christological interpretation of the lament of the sinner of verses two and three 
which Luther has learned from the church’s Christological interpretation of the penitential Psalms (so 
Helmer, The trinity and Martin Luther, 156-63) and the inclusion of the human in the divine reality. 
43
So Helmer, The trinity and Martin Luther, 134-46; cf. the bold statement in Hinlicky, “Luther’s 
New Langauge of the Spirit,” 139: “The new language of theology . . . is the Spirit’s own hearing, 
confessing, rejoicing in us of the infinite inner-trinitarian love of the Father for the Son and the Son 
for the Father.” Acknowledging his debts to Robert Jenson for this insight, Hinlicky emphasizes that 
this does not imply an acceptance of Jenson’s critique of the “axiom of impassibility”; on the 
contrary, Hinlicky considers this “axiom” as “essential . . . in any serious doctrine of God as Creator” 
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emphases are concerned?
44
 And has not the attempt at restarting the dialogue been a 
continuous, and not entirely successful, struggle with theological differences and 
misunderstandings acerbated by the lack of a common terminology and several centuries of 
almost total lack of communication?
45
 In that respect, dialogue between Protestants and 
Roman-Catholics often seem much easier, as these denominations at least share a common 
terminology that facilitate the task of agreeing on the topics of disagreement. 
 There are, however, observations that may point in a somewhat different direction. 
Obviously, the 16
th
 century dialogue did not move much beyond mutual misunderstandings 
heavily influenced by the very different problem histories of the two theological traditions; 
when the Orthodox said “deification”, the Lutherans heard “synergism” or “Semi-
Pelagianism”, and when the Lutherans said “original sin”, the Orthodox heard 
“Manichaeism”. Added to this were the inner-Lutheran developments through which the 
second and third generations of Lutheran theologians – while retaining a continuity with the 
Christology of the Church Fathers
46
 and an appreciation of the significance of the doctrinal 
continuity of the church
47
 that were quite close to Orthodox emphases – lost Luther’s 
apophatic appreciation of divine unknowability and replaced it with an understanding of the 
rational transparency of revelation that emphasized the identity between the eternal word of 
God and its written manifestation in the Bible.
48
 In due time, this paved the way for Lutheran 
theology being connected with typically modern philosophical sensibilities, with the 
                                                                                                                                                        
(p. 140). 
44
Jane E. Strohl, “Lutheran-Orthodox dialogue : A sixteenth-century encounter”; D Richard 
Stuckwisch, “Justification and deification”. 
45
For an overview of the documents of the current dialogue, see Zwanepol, “Zur Diskussion um 
Gottes Verborgenheit”. 
46
Article 8 of the Formula of Concord and Martin Chemnitz’ De duabus naturis Christi clearly 
document this; on this topic, see further J Francis Watson, “Chemnitz and the Eastern Church”. 
47
Cf. e.g., the defence of the doctrinal significance of tradition given in Martin Chemnitz, 
Examination of the Council of Trent, 217-307, originally published in 1565. 
48
Gottfried Hornig, “Lehre und Bekenntnis im Protestantismus,” 78-79. The development toward one-
sided rationality was even more unambiguous in Reformed Orthodoxy; see Alfsvåg, “Who has known 
the mind of the Lord?,” 41-44. 
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opponents to this development being heard as little more than protests from the margins.
49
 
 The outcome of this development is arguably the rather paradoxical situation 
documented in this article, where Orthodox authors draw from the same sources as, and in 
many respects are much closer to, the thinking of Martin Luther than many of the theologians 
working within the tradition that carries his name. One could of course use this as a pretext 
for lamenting the lack of ecumenical responsibility within much contemporary Lutheran and 
Protestant theology. I would, however, rather suggest that we focus on the potential of the 
situation. If the renewed understanding of Luther’s Trinitarian theology as developed in this 
article is not entirely misleading, engagement with the Orthodox tradition should give 
Lutherans a unique possibility of rediscovering some of the central elements of their own 
theological trajectory. At the same time, it could give Orthodox theologians a glimpse of an 
in many ways typically Western theology where they, given the time needed for obtaining the 
necessary familiarity, still could come to feel very much at home. This particular interaction 
thus in my view holds unique possibilities for actually moving us closer to a better 
understanding what the Christian message is all about. 
     
                                                 
49
The most important opponents in my view are Hamann and Kierkegaard. One could also point to the 
so-called New Lutheranism of the 19
th
 century as significant in this respect. 
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